failure to recognize radical evil. Just as the traveller whose. sights are set on distant heights is most likely to fall into a chasm, so Gandhi, with his fixed focus on nonviolence, adopted a simplistic view of violence -one that lumped together uncritically colonialism, warfare, and all forms of human inhumanity. This led him, says Chatterjee, "to preach the efficacy of non-violence in a host of situations of which his own experience had left him quite ignorant" (p.119).
Of particular interest to Christian readers is Chatterjee's chapter entitl~d "Prophets and Horizons", in which she examines Gandhi's correspondence with Martin Buber and where she concludes that Gandhi shares characteristics with the Judaeo-Christian prophetic tradition. Like Buber, Gandhi is drawn away from otherworldly mysticism, whether it be the esoteric realms of the Kabbala or the Theosophists' desire to ascend the levels of consciousness. Although Gandhi and Bub.er never met, nor reached any meeting of minds in .their correspondence, Chatterjee concludes that there is common ground between Buber's "prophetic spirit" and Gandhi's "prophetic politics". It is found in concern for the conditions of the least privileged members of . society. But Buber remains critical of Gandhi's attempt to bring religion fully into Book ,I
I 58 Book Reviews Bracken borrows two related insights from the process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. First, the· divine source, the "creator", is not an entity but a process, the underlying activity which serves as the ontological ground for everything that exists" (pp.2-3). Second, the created world must be understood not as the sum of various created things, but rather as an "extensive continuum" ... which underlies the whole world, past, present, and future in that it provides a "relational complex" in which all entities, both actual and potential, have their standpoint or niche" (p.3).
Bracken accepts these insights as universally true, and he undertakes comparative exercises to demonstrate them. To insure against a naive cultural imperialism, he heeds Robert Neville's cautions on how philosophical comparison should proceed. According to Neville, comparativists inevitably and rightly use categories rooted in one tradition -usually their own -but they must generalize them in a way that opens them up for. fruitful comparison and facilitates an understanding of philosophies framed in other categories. The comparativist must develop sufficiently vague categories, by which "a conception from some' one tradition is extended, abstracted further, and purified of its particularities to serve as a vague ground for comparison" (p.l). Bracken argues that Whitehead's "creativity" and "continuum" are two such categories, and uses them accordingly. The first part of the book develops his position on divine creativity in regard to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart, Shelling, Heidegger, and Whitehead; Bracken is obviously expert and at ease here, and his expositions are informative and subtle. The second part shows how the same principles operate in three Asian contexts: The Non-Dualist Vedanta view of the identity-in-difference of personal self and absolute, cosmic Self~ the Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-arising, and the Chinese Tao. In regard to each, Bracken makes a judicious use of secondary sources to support his view that "creativity" and not "entity" is the best category by which to understand what is going on in religious traditions . This is a fine book, carefully conceived and argued, skilfully articulating philosophical questions and seeking to illustrate their answers in a variety of contexts. It shows us how a strongly philosophical approach to comparative study can be of great use . in cross-cultural philosophy and theology. Indeed, it is so carefully and earnestly accomplished that it seems mean-spirited to note what The Divine Matrix does not accomplish; but in the spirit of Bracken's evident openness to dialogue, I raise the following points regarding what he gains and loses by the ambitious sweep of the book.
By skimming multiple traditions -by not focusing on a more limited range of materials; by not reading primary textsBracken deprives himself of valuable and challenging resources. While he successfully gleans important points of philosophical interest from the Asian traditions he treats, he does not really get involved with their philosophizing in any broader sense; rather, he simply subsumes things said elsewhere into an already-fashioned philosophical apparatus, and thereby limits the philosophical value of his own work. As fine as it is, this book is not so much a philosophizing across cllitural boundaries as an established philosophy which draws examples from traditions other than its original one. For example, his treatment of Vedanta is mediated through a reliance on the work of Raimundo Panikkar who, in tum, distilled his treatment of the Upani~ads into six "great sayings" drawn primarily from several Non-Dualist Vedanta sources. Bracken uses these sayings as a handy way . to assess what V e,danta is all about, but the result seems too neat and simple: generalizations about generalizations, without a sense of the historical choices involved on the Vedanta side. He might have done better to read one or another whole Upani~ad, along with a traditional conunentary, to see how claims regarding the identity of the human self and the ultimate Self functioned in some· actual context. This process would Obviously have been more time-consuming, and other comparisons would have been left out, but the result would have been more fruitful. Since Bracken legitimately relies on secondary sources, he would have strengthened his case by evaluating the philosophical status of this borrowing. Just as he uses Whitehead's categories in a legitimately vague manner, he needs also to assess the philosophical status of the secondary and derivative representations he makes of Asian traditions. It is one thing to generalize from materials in which one is expert, and quite another to draw conclusions about less familiar traditions, based on summations gleaned from secondary sources. Though such conclusions are inevitable, it is important not to think of them as "windows" on the . actual philosophical thinking of the culture. Rather, they represent a complex cross-cultural derivation in· which concepts such as "Vedanta" and "Taoism" vacillate in status between being iterable entities and elusive In any case, The Divine Matrix invites us to undertake further comparative philosophical and theological exercises: for example, a focused rereading of Whitehead in light of the categories of some particular school of Buddhist thought; or a more prolonged and focused reflection on the Thomistic language of being, in light of Vedanta. Indeed, we look for such works from Bracken's own pen.
Briefly Noted
Francis X. Clooney, S.J. Boston College philosophy and religion, in particular Hinduism and Christianity, provides an introductory overview of Hindu-Christian dialogue during the past 150 years which he concludes with a brief outline of Hick's theory of pluralism. The book contains five parts beginning with "Inter-Faith Dialogue and World Community" , followed by "Religious Pluralism and Peaceful CoExistence", "Dialogue and Religious Studies", "Inter-Faith Dialogue and World Community", and "Dialogue of Religions for Communal Harmony and World Peace".
